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Abstract
Many philosophers assume that, when making moral decisions under un-
certainty, we should choose the option that has the greatest expected moral
value, regardless of how risky it is. But their arguments for maximizing ex-
pected moral value do not support it over rival, risk-averse approaches. In
this paper, I present a novel argument for maximizing expected value: when
we think about larger series of decisions that each decision is a part of, all
but the most risk-averse agents would prefer that we consistently choose
the option with the highest expected value. To the extent that what we
choose on a given occasion should be guided by the entire series of choices
we prefer, then on each occasion, we should choose the option with the
highest expected moral value.
Suppose that ten hikers have been trapped in an avalanche. You oversee a disaster
response effort, and you’re presented with two options. Option A is highly risky:
it has a 50% chance of saying all ten people and a 50% chance of failing to save
anyone. Option B , on the other hand, is safer: it will certainly save four people.
Option A leads to more people saved on expectation, yet many of us, being risk-
averse, would still prefer option B .
Now suppose you had to choose between options A and B as a policy, which
would be followed a large number of times in similar situations. In that case,
nearly all of us—all except the most risk-averse—would choose option A. After
all, it’s extremely unlikely that in the long run, option B would lead to more lives
saved than option A. In fact, unless you are extraordinarily risk-averse, in some
∗The ideas behind this paper originated over a decade ago; I am grateful to Peter Diao for
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especially an anonymous referee for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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technical sense to be clarified later, whatever your level of risk aversion, there’s
some number of repetitions of A that you would prefer to that many repetitions
of B .
Thoughts like this form the basis for an intuitive argument for choosing the
option with the highest expected moral value when we face moral decisions un-
der uncertainty, regardless of how risky that option is. In this paper, I’ll advance
a rigorous version of this argument. I’ll begin, in §1, by motivating the question
of how we should act morally under uncertainty. As I’ll argue, although those
in the discussion often assume that we should maximize expected moral value,
it’s not immediately obvious that we should. In §§2–3, I’ll present the original
argument for maximizing expected moral value. As I’ll argue, even if we aren’t
risk-neutral, we should still typically act as if we were. §4 responds to objections.
1 Acting morally under uncertainty
How should we choose between different options when the outcomes of those
options are uncertain? Let me make two simplifying restrictions. First, I’ll re-
strict my attention to cases where none of the options involve violating any deon-
tological constraints, including those about actively imposing the risk of harm
on people. Second, although this is a paper on how to act morally under un-
certainty, I won’t delve into the question of moral uncertainty, the question of
how to act morally if one is uncertain about which moral theory is correct.1
Rather, I’m dealing with garden-variety empirical uncertainty, uncertainty about
the consequences of different courses of action.2
Within the literature on moral decision under uncertainty, many have as-
sumed that expected-value maximization (EVM) is the correct answer by default:
that is, we should assess acts by averaging over the moral value of the possible out-
comes of each act, weighted by the probability of those outcomes, and choose
the act that has the highest expected moral value.3 Formally, if an act has pos-
sible outcomes A1, . . . ,An with probabilities p1, . . . , pn, the right act is the one
1There’s now a burgeoning literature on the topic. See, for example, Sepielli (2009),
MacAskill et al. (2020), Rosenthal (forthcoming).
2Some prefer to reserve “uncertainty” for cases in which the probabilities of the possible out-
comes are unknown, and use “risk” for cases in which they are known. I’ll use “uncertainty” in
a broad sense, to cover any decision where the agent is uncertain of the outcome. The probabil-
ities can be objective or subjective: they can be genuine chance-properties of events, or merely
expressive of the agent’s credences.




i=1 V (Ai )pi , where V (Ai ) is the moral value of outcome i .
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Sometimes, EVM is even seen as a reformulation of consequentialism to account
for action under uncertainty.
Note that EVM is, in a sense, risk-neutral: an agent who maximizes expected
value does not care about how risky a particular option is, and would prefer an
option that has a barely-higher-than-50% chance of saving ten lives to another
that saves five lives with certainty, even though the first option is much riskier
than the second. In contrast, other approaches typically embody various forms
of risk aversion. For example, we can employ a maximin approach, according
to which we compare the worst possible outcome that each act produces, and
choose the act that produces the least bad of these outcomes. This would be
admittedly an extreme form of risk aversion, since we would be willing to tol-
erate much worse expected outcomes, so long as the worst possible outcome is
not as bad as for other acts. For this reason, I suspect that very few of us would
adopt the maximin approach for reasons having to do with risk.5 But there are
other approaches that embody less extreme forms of risk aversion, like a rank-
weighted view, where we give extra weight to the bad possible outcomes, or a
view on which we maximize the expectation of some concave function (like the
logarithm or square root) of the moral value of the outcome.
Now, although EVM is one principle for action under uncertainty, it is un-
clear what argument, if any, its proponents have against rival principles.6 Frank
4Of course, this assumes that moral value can be represented by real numbers. This in turn
assumes, among other things, that different types of moral value or disvalue are fully aggregable,
and that we can aggregate moral value for particular individuals into impersonal moral value.
These are controversial assumptions, but standard for those working on this issue.
5It’s telling that those who accept a maximin principle (like Rawls 1971) typically do so not
out of risk aversion, but for other reasons: according to Rawls, for example, reasonable agents
behind the veil of ignorance choose the maximin because they are unwilling to impose possible
sacrifices on others for their own possible gain, not because they are afraid of ending up in the
worst possible outcome. Rawls (1971, 13f) goes so far as to resist using the term “maximin” for
the difference principle, on the grounds that using it
might wrongly suggest that the main argument for this principle from the original
position derives from an assumption of very high risk aversion. There is indeed
a relation between the difference principle and such an assumption, but extreme
attitudes to risk are not postulated; and in any case, there are many considerations
in favor of the difference principle in which the aversion to risk plays no role at
all.
6Some take EVM to follow from the idea that rational agents maximize expected utility,
which is part of orthodox decision theory (Jackson 1991, MacAskill et al. 2020). As I’ll show
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Jackson (1991, 463), for example, simply calls EVM “the obvious answer.” But
although it might seem like an obvious answer, given the plentitude of possible
answers, it’s not obvious that it is the correct one.
In fact, the claim that EVM is the correct way to act under uncertainty seems
to conflict with our intuitions about certain cases. Consider the following case:
(Disease:) Suppose that 1,000 people in a large city have been infected
with a deadly disease. You’re in charge of disease control for the
city, and you’re considering two responses. Response A is risky: it
could be a complete success and save all 1,000 people, or it could be a
complete failure and save no one; you estimate the chances of success
at 50%. Response B , on the other hand, is guaranteed to save exactly
400 people.
I take it that, in such a case, many of us would prefer option B over option
A.7 This preference seems permissible: there doesn’t seem anything obviously
morally objectionable about playing it safe here, even though the riskier option
would lead, on expectation, to more lives’ being saved. Some might even think
that it’s morally obligatory to go with the safe option here, since, given the stakes,
going with the risky one would be reckless.8
in the next section, this is badly mistaken, at least on the orthodox interpretation of what it
is for rational agents to maximize expected utility. (For one thing, expected-utility theory can
accommodate risk aversion, whereas EVM cannot.)
7This prediction is in line with ordinary people’s reactions to similar vignettes, like the fa-
mous one Tversky and Kahneman (1981) devised to demonstrate loss aversion, in which a large
majority of respondents chose a treatment that saves 200 people with certainty to one that saved
600 people with a 1/3 chance. Of course, Tversky and Kahneman also showed that, because
what people take to be a loss depends on how the scenario is framed, a large majority chose the
initially dispreferred treatment in a description of the scenario framed in terms of deaths rather
than lives saved. Such a sensitivity to framing would undermine the evidential weight of people’s
intuitions in these cases. But it poses no problem for us, since our point in appealing to these
intuitions is simply to support the claim that maximizing expected value often conflicts with
ordinary intuitions.
8Rosenthal (forthcoming) argues for this point, although in the context of moral rather than
empirical uncertainty; the considerations that she cites, however, extend to empirical uncer-
tainty. As she writes,
Consider what orthodox decision-theory [read: EVM] can say about a choice be-
tween the following two acts, when both acts’ moral status is uncertain. The first
act might be extremely morally choice-worthy or it might be morally horrific . . .
A second act is much lower stakes, with an equal possibility that it’s mildly good or
mildly bad, but little chance of anything more significant . . . Depending upon how
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Or consider the following case:
(Game show:) Suppose you’re playing for a charity on a game show
where you answer questions correctly for money. Assume that each
dollar won allows the charity to do the same amount of good as the
previous dollar: say, every $5 won lets the charity buy an additional
mosquito net that will protect someone against malaria. You’ve al-
ready won $50,000. You’re faced with the choice between walking
away with that amount of money, or taking a stab at the $1 million
question, which you only have a 10% chance of answering correctly.
If you answer that question incorrectly, you lose all of the money
you’ve won.
Taking a stab at the $1 million question has higher expected moral value: on
expectation, it does .1×$1,000,000= $100,000 worth of good, whereas walking
away does only $50,000 worth of good. But again, it seems morally permissible to
opt for the safer choice, and walk away with the $50,000. (Note that the defender
of EVM can’t defend this decision by invoking the decreasing marginal value of
money: we’ve stipulated that each additional dollar does as much good as the last
dollar.)
Finally, consider the following:
(Wealthy donor:) You head an effort to inoculate children in a very
populous country against a deadly childhood disease. An extremely
wealthy, and eccentric, philanthropist makes you the following of-
fer. Either (A) he will flip a fair coin until it lands tails; if it lands tails
on the first toss, he provides enough resources for one child to be in-
oculated; if on the second toss, for two children to be inoculated; if
on the third toss, for four children; and so on; or (B) he will provide
the resources for all ten of the children in a particular village to be
inoculated.
we specify the particulars, an orthodox decision-theoretic approach to moral un-
certainty may end up treating these two cases as equivalent or near equivalent, be-
cause the first act’s extreme options should be able to balance each other and yield
a fairly moderate expected moral rightness. But the stakes seem to make a moral
difference. It will sometimes be morally reprehensible to risk moral catastrophe—
in some cases this will be too reckless—while low-stakes risks may be acceptable,
despite having the same expected moral rightness.
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Of course, this is just a moral analog of the St. Petersburg paradox. The expected














Since this is a diverging series, for any finite number, option A will on expecta-
tion cause more than that many children to be inoculated—certainly more than
ten.9 So if EVM is correct, then you should choose option A over option B . But
intuitively, you would be acting recklessly if you chose option A; it doesn’t seem
like we’re permitted to sacrifice a small good thing for a very low probability
of something much better. Some (Bostrom 2009, Monton 2019) have even ar-
gued that we should simply discount extremely low probabilities to zero in our
decision-making, so that we should prefer the safer, lower-EV option in cases like
this.10
Such examples may be extreme, but we face more mundane moral decisions
under uncertainty all the time. We might face a decision between telling an im-
pressionable student to follow his passion, and advising him to find a stable job;
between donating to a charity with ambitious goals that are difficult to realize,
and donating to one with more modest aims; between supporting a radical move-
ment that might make society much better or much worse, and supporting the
status quo. In each of these cases, it seems at least permissible to choose the safer
option, even if it has lower expected moral value.
The fact that we apparently may prefer the less risky option to the riskier
one, even though the riskier option has higher expected moral value, weakens
9One might object that there are only finitely many children to be inoculated, so the possible
value of option A is bounded. Even so, the expected value of A is greater than that of B , assuming a
large enough upper bound. For example, if there are ten million (≈ 223) children to be vaccinated,


























which is still greater than the expected value of B .
10And again, unlike in the St. Petersburg paradox, which involves a lottery with infinite ex-
pected monetary value, one cannot defend EVM in this example on the basis that additional units
of money generate less and less of whatever value we are trying to maximize, so that choosing
option A does not necessarily maximize expected value. The tenth million dollars won create
much less happiness than the first million, but the inoculation of the tenth million children does
not have less moral value than that of the first million.
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the claim that maximizing expected moral value is the obviously correct proce-
dure for action under uncertainty. One might even doubt that there’s anything
like an obligatory choice in cases like this; one might think so long as one’s risk
attitude lies in some reasonable range, any choice supported by that attitude is
permissible. And even if we think that choosing the higher-EV option in these
cases is obligatory, it’s easy to imagine someone who disagrees out of risk aver-
sion. It might bother us that there’s nothing we could say to a moderately risk-
averse person that would convince him to maximize expected moral value.
How can a defender of EVM argue for the claim that his approach is oblig-
atory in cases like these? One natural thought is to appeal to the long run, the
consequences of many independent repetitions of the scenarios. If everyone in
relevantly similar circumstances chose the riskier, but higher-EV option (option
A), then the consequences would be better than those if everyone opted for the
safer option (option B). After all, by the law of large numbers, if a large number,
n, of people were placed in situations like disease, and the results of each situation
were independent from the others, then everyone’s choosing the riskier option
would lead to 500n lives saved, whereas everyone’s choosing the safer option
would only lead to 400n lives saved.11
But this argument is flawed—or at least incomplete. First, we need a principle
linking what agents ought to do on a particular occasion with what happens in the
long run. Such a need is especially pressing given that many of these decisions
are unlikely to be faced more than once: it’s unlikely that someone will be in a
situation exactly like disease or game show more than once. One might think that
what happens in the long run is simply irrelevant for decisions that are unlikely
to be repeated. Second, it’s false that if everyone in a situation like disease were
to choose option A, then around 500n people would definitely be saved. What
the law of large numbers implies is that, as n increases, the average lives saved on
each repetition tends toward 500 with probability 1. But it’s still uncertain what
outcome will actualize. With 100 repetitions, for example, we get the following
distribution of possible outcomes and probabilities, centered around 50,000 lives
saved: {100,000 saved, (1/2)100; 99,000 saved, 100×(1/2)100; 98,000 saved, 100×992 ×
(1/2)100; . . . ; 1000 saved, 100× (1/2)100; none saved, (1/2)100}. Many of these
outcomes are such that choosing option B would have led to more lives saved.
So we can’t say with certainty that the higher-EV option will lead to a better
11This argument emerges from time to time, although (as far as I know) there’s no definitive
statement of it in the literature. For a recent statement of the argument in the context of her
REU theory, see Buchak (2013, 7.3).
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outcome, even in the long run.
Of course, after a large number of independent repetitions, the probability
that option A leads to a better outcome is very high; for example, there’s only
a 2.8% chance that, after 100 repetitions, option A leads to a worse outcome
than option B . And one might think that this fact justifies choosing the EV-
maximizing option. But this response runs the risk of begging the question:
after all, to be risk-averse is just to give weight to negative outcomes dispropor-
tionate to their disvalue or their probability. So telling risk-averse agents that the
probability of a worse outcome with the riskier option is very small in the long
run might be unconvincing.
If appealing to the finite long run doesn’t work for the EV-maximizer, per-
haps he can appeal to the infinite long run. If people were either to choose option
A or option B an infinite number of times, then the former would lead to a bet-
ter outcome with probability 1. But a probability of 1 doesn’t mean certainty.12
After all, it’s possible for the behavior of an actual series to depart from its lim-
iting behavior: the ratio of heads in a series of tosses of a fair coin tends to 1/2
with probability 1, but the coin could keep turning up tails indefinitely. Simi-
larly, even with an infinite number of repetitions of disease, option A could keep
failing to save anyone. And, more importantly, it’s unclear how an appeal to
the consequences of actions when repeated an infinite number of times has any
bearing on what an agent on a particular occasion should do, especially given the
worries about repeatability mentioned earlier.
In the rest of this paper, I’ll advance a refined version of the long-run argu-
ment that avoids the problems of this naive formulation. Such an argument aims
to convince all but extraordinarily risk-averse agents that, when they face decisions
under uncertainty, they morally ought to choose the option that maximizes ex-
pected moral value.
Let us take some preliminary steps before we begin the argument. First,
we should replace talk of the consequences of a particular act, as if those con-
sequences were known beforehand, with something that accommodates their
uncertainty. So instead, we’ll talk in terms of the lotteries, or sets of possible out-
comes and their respective possibilities, yielded by the acts: so the lottery associ-
ated with the riskier response in disease is {1000 people saved, 1/2; no one saved,
1/2}; the lottery associated with going for the $1 million question is {win $1
12Those who endorse the principle of regularity, according to which every possible event has
non-zero (possibly infinitesimal) probability, deny this. But if regularity is correct, then average
value converges to expected value with some probability infinitesimally smaller than 1.
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million, 1/10; win nothing, 9/10}. Second, since two rational agents might have
different levels of risk aversion, hence have different preferences over the same set
of lotteries, we won’t say that an act yields a better lottery than another; instead,
we’ll say the lottery yielded by one is preferable to that yielded by another for a
particular rational agent. (I’ll use “rational” just to mean that the agent’s prefer-
ences satisfy certain structural constraints—more on this in the next section.) I’ll
also sometimes talk about an agent’s preferring one act or choice over another
as shorthand for the agent’s preferring the lottery yielded by the former to that
yielded by the latter. Choosing the most preferable lottery becomes the prob-
abilistic extension of maximizing value, and the generalization of maximizing
expected value to cases where the agent isn’t risk-neutral.
Next, we won’t talk about the lotteries yielded by repeating a decision, since
the decisions may not be likely to be repeated (that is, with the exact same possi-
ble lotteries). Instead, we’ll talk in terms of long series of decisions that individual
decisions are embedded in. The decision about which disease response to choose,
for example, is part of the series of decisions under uncertainty that the agent
faces across his lifetime, and it is also part of the set of decisions under uncer-
tainty faced by agents collectively. So even though it might not make sense to
talk about the long run in the sense of a large number of identical repetitions of
some decision, we can still meaningfully talk about it in the sense of a long series
of possibly non-identical decisions.
The structure of the next sections is as follows. In §2, I’ll defend a claim
about rational agents’ preferences in the long run. When we think about de-
cisions as one-offs, different agents have different preferences, even if they are
all fully rational: in a one-off case, a risk-neutral agent would prefer option A
in cases like disease, whereas a risk-averse one might prefer option B . Nonethe-
less, when it comes to long enough series of decisions, then given certain minimal
conditions, the preferences of all but the most risk-averse agents converge: all
agents who are not extraordinarily risk-averse will prefer the lottery yielded by
our consistently choosing the option with the higher EV to that yielded by our
consistently choosing the option with the lower EV, even if what those options
are differs from occasion to occasion. In §3, I’ll show how such a claim is relevant
to what we ought do on a particular occasion by arguing that we should assess




To begin the argument for maximizing expected moral value, I’ll introduce and
defend the following principle about rational agents’ preferences over long series
of decisions:
Long-run preference: For any two series of lotteries A1, . . . ,An and
B1, . . . ,Bn such that (1) the series are long enough, (2) the lotteries are
all probabilistically independent of each other, (3) the series are well-
behaved, and (4) and for all i , Ai has higher expected value than Bi , a
rational agent prefers the compound lottery that results from accept-
ing A1, . . . ,An to the compound lottery that results from accepting
B1, . . . ,Bn, so long as the agent is not extraordinarily risk-averse.
To motivate long-run preference, consider a special case: one in which a
rational agent has a choice between a large number, n, of independent repeti-
tions of some risky lottery A and that many independent repetitions of some
safer, but lower-EV lottery B . (This is just the case where A1 = . . . = An and
B1 = . . . = Bn.) In this case, long-run preference says that so long as an agent
is not extraordinarily risk-averse, then even if he prefers B to A as a one-off, he
will prefer n repetitions of A to n repetitions of B . For example, although we
might prefer the status quo over a one-time lottery in which we win $200 with
probability 1/2 and lose $100 with probability 1/2, we would probably prefer a
series of 100 such lotteries to the status quo. Although we might prefer to save
four people with certainty over having a 50-50 chance of saving ten, we would
probably prefer choosing the latter option 100 times over choosing the former
option 100 times. In the long run, all but extraordinarily risk-averse agents will
prefer the lottery with the higher expected value.13
Long-run preference generalizes this claim to the case where the lotteries on
subsequent occasions are not necessarily identical. If a rational agent is presented
with a long series of decisions, each of which is between a riskier but higher-EV
13The condition that the probabilities on subsequent repetitions be independent from one
another is important. In the case where the lottery is {win $200, 1/2; lose $100, 1/2}, if a single
coin toss at the beginning determines the result of all of the repetitions, then the only possible
outcomes of the 100 repetitions are: {win $20,000, 1/2; lose $10,000, 1/2}. No one who would
not accept the one-time lottery would accept this lottery either.
For this reason, the argument for maximizing expected moral value in the case of empirical
uncertainty cannot be extended to the case of moral uncertainty: what happens on one occasion
may be independent from what happens on another occasion, but what the true moral theory is
on one occasion is not independent from what the true moral theory is on another occasion.
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option and a safer but lower-EV option, then so long as the agent is not extraordi-
narily risk-averse and some other minimal conditions are satisfied, the agent will
prefer the lottery that results from her consistently choosing the higher-EV op-
tion to the lottery that results from her consistently choosing the lower-EV one,
even if what the higher- and lower-EV options are is different on each occasion.14
The basic idea behind the principle is simple. It’s been understood for a long
time that even if people are risk-averse, so that they would reject one-time lot-
teries with positive expected monetary value, because of how independent risks
reduce when added, people may accept compound lotteries that are formed by
adding many of the one-time lotteries. This is, after all, the basis for insurance.
From the perspective of the policyholder, paying a small amount each month is
better than standing to lose a large amount with a small probability, even if the
expected monetary value of the policy is negative. From the perspective of the
insurance company, even if the company is as risk-averse as its policyholders, it’s
rational to sell a large number of such policies (that is, accept a large number of
lotteries that are risky but have positive expected monetary value). After all, if
the risks are independent, the company is almost guaranteed to come out ahead.
In fact, a formal result similar to long-run preference has been proven in the
framework of Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected-utility theory (von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern 1953). In order to state the formal result, I’ll first have
to rehearse the expected-utility framework. In this framework, risk aversion (and
risk attitudes in general) are captured through a device for representing agents’
preferences known as a utility function, U (·), which associates each possible out-
come with a real number representing its choiceworthiness for the agent. It’s
crucial to note that “utility” here doesn’t mean what moral philosophers use it
to mean, moral value. Rather, on the orthodox version of the expected-utility
framework, the utility function of an agent is simply a theoretical construct de-
14Obviously, generalizing the result requires introducing additional requirements on the se-
ries, which I’ve lumped together under the vague requirement that they be “well-behaved.” The
requirement is meant to rule out improbable cases like those where one decision has stakes that
swamp all others, like a decision between the lottery {one million people live, 1/2; no one lives,
1/2} and {400,000 people live, 1} in the context of the decisions that an ordinary person would
be likely to face. After all, if one decision swamps all others, then the lottery yielded by the
entire series of choices would be dominated by that one decision, so that someone who prefers
the safer choice in that decision might prefer the entire safer series of choices. Similarly, it rules
out outlandish cases like one where the difference in the expected value between the Ai ’s and the
Bi ’s asymptotically approaches 0, but the Ai ’s do not become less risky, so that each additional Ai
makes the entire series less choiceworthy relative to each additional Bi . But most of the decisions
that we ordinarily face under uncertainty are not part of such pathological series.
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signed to capture the agent’s preferences over possible outcomes, on the assump-
tion that those preferences satisfy some basic conditions of rationality.15 (That
the agent must satisfy these conditions on rationality secures the role of expected-
utility theory as a normative theory.)
According to the framework, a utility function that represents the agent’s
preferences is such that the agent always prefers the option that maximizes expected
utility. What this means is as follows. Suppose that L is a lottery with out-
comes A1, . . . ,Am with probabilities p1, . . . , pm, and M is a lottery with outcomes
B1, . . . ,Bn with probabilities q1, . . . , qn. Then the expected value of the utility









qi U (Bi ).
Colloquially, the expected utility of a lottery is the average of the utilities of its
outcomes, weighted by their probabilities. A rational agent prefers one lottery
to another if and only if the expected utility of the first is higher.
Here’s an example that shows how expected-utility theory captures attitudes
to risk. Consider choosing between the following two lotteries: in L, you win
$100 (for certain); in M , you have a 50% chance of winning $200, and a 50%
chance of winning nothing. Although they have the same expected monetary
value, most of us, being risk-averse, would prefer L to M . Expected-utility the-
ory captures this by assigning to us a concave utility function, that is, one that
“opens downward”—mathematically, one whose second derivative is negative.
What this means is that the utility of winning $200 is less than twice the utility
of winning $100. For example, suppose the utility function U (x) =
p
x repre-
sents our preferences. The expected utility of L is 1×
p
100 = 10, whereas the




0= 7.1. So even though both lotter-
ies have the same expected monetary value, the non-risky lottery has a higher
expected utility, which captures the fact that we prefer that lottery.
15See, for example, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), Arrow (1951), Luce and Raiffa
(1957). von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, 28) write: “We have practically defined numerical
utility as being that thing for which the calculus of mathematical expectations is legitimate.”
The conditions that an agent’s preferences must satisfy are typically taken to be: (1) complete-
ness, that for any pair of lotteries, the agent prefers one to the other or is indifferent between
them; (2) transitivity, that the preference relation is transitive; and (3) continuity, that for any
three lotteries, the agent is indifferent between some probabilistic combination of the best and
worse lotteries and the third lottery.
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Again, utilities in the decision-theoretic sense are theoretical constructs de-
signed to represent the preferences of a rational agent, rather than anything of
direct moral relevance. It’s important not to confuse the idea that rational agents
maximize expected utility, which is true tautologically (being equivalent to the
claim that agents whose preferences satisfy certain conditions have preferences
that satisfy those conditions), with the claim that we ought to maximize expected
moral value, which is a substantive moral claim. It’s conceptually possible for
the former to be true and the latter false. For example, we might be morally re-
quired to maximize the logarithm of expected moral value, given some measure
of moral value; in doing so, however, so long as our preferences are complete,
transitive, and continuous, we can still be represented as maximizing expected
utility.16
Having rehearsed expected-utility theory, we’re in a position to discuss the
formal result similar to long-run preference, which I’ll call long-run accep-
tance. Colloquially, the result says that for a long enough series of lotteries with
positive EVs, even if a rational agent rejects each lottery as a one-off because of its
riskiness, unless the agent is extraordinarily risk-averse, she will accept the sum
of all of those lotteries.17
More formally, suppose that there is some series of lotteries X1,X2,X3, . . .
such that (1) each lottery has positive EV, (2) the lotteries are independent of
each other, and (3) the series is well-behaved; and that some agent has preferences
representable by U (·). Let’s call X1 + . . .+Xi the lottery yielded by an agent’s
16For this reason, some decision theorists write that it is misleading to say that decision theory
enjoins us to maximize expected utility. Jamie Dreier (1996, 253), for example, writes,
It is, I think, very misleading to think of decision theory as telling you to maxi-
mize your expected utility. If you don’t obey its axioms, then there is no utility
function constructable for you to maximize the expected value of. If you do obey
the axioms, then your expected utility is always maximized, so the advice is unnec-
essary. The advice, ‘Maximize Expected Utility’ misleadingly suggests that there is
some quantity, definable and discoverable independent of the formal construction
of your utility function, that you are supposed to be maximizing.
17See Ross (1999). Ross actually proves a version of the result where acceptance is not nec-
essarily monotonic: even if an agent accepts some long series of lotteries, he may not accept a
continuation of that series with other positive-EV lotteries. He notes that whether an agent with
a particular utility function will monotonically accept a particular series of lotteries depends on,
in addition to that utility function, features of that series. I’ve added the “well-behaved” condition
on the series to restrict the result to those for which acceptance is monotonic. Nielsen (1985),
Lippman and Mamer (1988) proved a special case of this result, for independent repetitions of
the same lottery, although theirs features monotonic acceptance.
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accepting all of the lotteries X1, . . . ,Xi . (So if each Xi is a lottery in which you
win $200 if a fair coin lands heads, and lose $100 if it lands tails, then X1+. . .+X100
is the lottery that results from flipping a fair coin 100 times, winning you $200
for each heads and losing you $100 for each tails.) Long-run acceptance says:
There is a threshold number m such that for all n > m, EU (X1 +
. . .+Xn)>U (∅), so long as limx→−∞U (x)eax = 0 for all a > 0.
That is, the agent will always accept a sufficiently long series of lotteries with
positive EVs, so long as some minimal conditions are met and the utility function
representing her preferences doesn’t grow exponentially or faster in the negative
direction. This condition on the agent’s utility function formalizes our talk of
not being “extraordinarily risk-averse.”18
The reader is advised to consult the papers cited for a formal proof of this
result, but the intuition is as follows. Because each lottery has positive expected
value, as the number of lotteries increases, the distribution of possible outcomes
will be shifted in the positive direction without a proportional increase in its
spread: in the special case of identical lotteries, for example, the mean outcome
will grow proportionally to n, but the standard deviation only proportionally
to
p
n. This means that the probability of getting an outcome worse than the
status quo decreases as the number of lotteries increases. Unless the agent’s utility
function grows faster in the negative direction than the probability decreases, the
expected utility of the series will increase as the number of lotteries increases.
Note that long-run acceptance concerns accepting a series of lotteries rather
than rejecting it: that is, preferring that series to the status quo. Long-run pref-
erence, as I’ve defined it, concerns preferring a series to another series. But it’s
easy to extend the former to the latter. Intuitively, take two series of lotteries,
A1, . . . ,An and B1, . . . ,Bn, where Ai has greater expected value than Bi for all i .
For each pair of Ai and Bi , consider a third lottery Ci , formed by receiving lot-
tery Ai and offering lottery Bi to someone else (i.e., accepting a lottery whose
outcomes are the negatives of the outcomes of Bi ). Because Ai has greater ex-
pected value than Bi , this third lottery has positive expected value. As a result,
18Having an exponential utility function seems at least sufficient for being extraordinarily
risk-averse in the ordinary sense. After all, if someone has an exponential utility function and is
indifferent between losing 50 cents for certain or having a one-in-two chance of losing a dollar
(so has preferences representable by U (x) = −1/4x ), then he will prefer to lose five dollars for
certain rather than face a one-in-1,000 chance of losing ten dollars, and will prefer to lose 50
dollars for certain rather than face a one-in-1030 chance of losing 100 dollars. Very few, if any of
us, exhibit such levels of risk aversion.
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given long-run acceptance, if n is large enough, the agent will accept the series
C1, . . . ,Cn, assuming that he is not extarordinarily risk-averse. But accepting this
series is equivalent to accepting A1, . . . ,An and offering someone else B1, . . . ,Bn.
If the agent accepts such a combination of lotteries, it seems clear that he prefers
A1, . . . ,An to B1, . . . ,Bn.
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While we used the framework of expected-utility theory to argue for long-
run preference, I want to note that the plausibility of the principle is not tied
to that theory. A rival approach to decision under uncertainty, like Lara Buchak
(2013)’s risk-adjusted expected-utility (REU) theory, would do as well. I’m using
the standard theory out of need for specificity, and for ease of exposition. In fact,
theories like REU are more obviously accommodating of long-run preference,
since they were designed in part to capture the intuition that people might ratio-
nally reject risky lotteries with positive expected values but accept compounds
of those lotteries.
I also want to note that nothing in the argument relies on the idea that de-
cisions need to be repeatable, where we individuate decisions based on the set
of attainable lotteries. After all, long-run preference does not require that the
same lotteries be repeated over and over; all it requires is that the choice between
the two lotteries appear in a long enough series of decisions between higher-EV
and lower-EV lotteries that satisfy some minimal conditions. As long as these
requirements are satisfied, then all but the most risk-averse agents would prefer
that the higher-EV option be chosen consistently. This is one advantage that
the current argument has over the intuitive long-run argument for maximizing
expected value. Again, recall that the intuitive argument went in terms of the
consequences of repeating particular decisions a large number of times; it was
vulnerable to the objection that many decisions are unlikely to be repeated, so
it is unclear what the relevance of the long run to what an agent should do on a
particular occasion is. The present argument does not assume repeatability; in its
stead, all it assumes is that individual decisions under uncertainty are embedded
19More formally, suppose that the agent has already accepted some lottery B . Consider the
lottery C , composed by accepting some lottery A (with higher expected value than B) and paying
whatever payoff lottery B produces. Suppose that the agent now accepts C . Since he has already
accepted B , he prefers to have A and B and to pay whatever B yields to having B . But having A
and B and paying the payoff from B is equivalent to having A. So the agent prefers A to B . Let
A=
∑n
i=1 Ai , B =
∑n
i=1 Bi , where the Ai ’s and Bi ’s are as above. Then C =
∑n
i=1 Ci , where each
Ci consists of accepting Ai and paying the payoff from Bi , which the agent has already accepted.
Since each Ci has positive expected value, long-run acceptance says that the agent will accept C ,
even if he has already accepted B . But this is equivalent to preferring A over B , which is long-run
preference.
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in larger series of decisions under uncertainty that agents face.
What does long-run preference say in the moral case? Suppose we have two
options A and B , the former of which has higher expected moral value: choos-
ing A leads, on expectation, to more lives saved, or welfare, or happiness, or
preference-satisfaction. Even so, A might have a riskier profile, and we might
morally prefer B over A on a one-off basis. Nonetheless, if such a decision is part
of a larger series of decisions between riskier but higher-EV and safer but lower-
EV options, all except the extraordinarily risk-averse among us would morally
prefer that the higher-EV option be chosen consistently, so that A would be cho-
sen over B .
As an example, consider disease again. In the one-off case, many of us would
prefer the less risky response, although it leads to fewer lives saved on expec-
tation. But imagine that such a decision is part of a larger series of decisions
between riskier but higher-EV and safer but lower-EV outcomes: for example,
imagine if decisions similar to this one were faced hundreds of times by disease
control agencies around the world, even if the details varied on each occasion.
Given this series of decisions, it is vanishingly unlikely that their always choos-
ing the safer option would save more lives than their choosing the riskier option,
so long as the risks are independent. Of course, there’s a tiny chance that every-
one’s choosing the risky option would lead to more lives being lost. But unless
an agent is extraordinarily risk-averse, long-run preference implies that the un-
choiceworthiness of that unlikely bad outcome is outweighed by the choicewor-
thiness of the very likely outcome in which it would lead to more lives saved. So
nearly all of us would prefer, on moral grounds, that everyone choose the riskier,
higher-EV option over the safer, lower-EV one.20
20I want to note that, although we have been assuming for simplicity that future wellbeing is
as valuable as current wellbeing, the argument does not need such an assumption. After all, the
decisions we are concerned with are those between options that have their effects at the same
time. So even if we applied a discount rate to the future, that will affect all options equally,
and typically (depending on the agent’s utility function) will not change an agent’s preferences
between them. For example, suppose that an agent has preferences representable by U (x) =p
x, and that one unit of wellbeing ten years from now is worth half a unit of wellbeing right
now. Then the decision between two lotteries A and B whose consequences occur in ten years is
equivalent to that between lotteries A′ and B ′ that take effect now, where the outcomes A′ and
B ′ are those of A and B divided by two. EU (A′) = EU (A)/
p
2 and EU (B ′) = EU (B)/
p
2, so
A′  B ′ iff A B .
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3 Indirect evaluation
So far, I’ve argued that, in considering long enough series of decisions under un-
certainty, consistently choosing the higher-EV option is preferable to choosing
otherwise to all but the most risk-averse agents. In order for this to be relevant
for what an agent should do on a particular occasion, it must be the case that we
should evaluate individual choices in what I’ll call an indirect way, by first eval-
uating larger sets or series of choices, and then evaluating the individual choices
in terms of the larger set of choices they belong to.
Why evaluate choices indirectly? Well, no decision under uncertainty is an
island; each decision we face is embedded in a larger series of decisions, like the
set of decisions we face over an entire lifetime, or the set of decisions faced by
agents altogether. As we’ll see, even if each member of some set of choices is
optimal as a one-off, the entire set of choices might be much worse than some
other set of choices. So instead of viewing decisions in isolation from each other,
we should look at some kind of larger series of decisions that each decision is
embedded in, and choose in accordance with the entire series of choices that yields
the most preferable lottery.
In this section, I’ll defend two separate indirect ways of evaluating the deci-
sions that an agent makes under uncertainty: first, in terms of the larger series
of decisions that the agent faces across his life; second, in terms of the set of de-
cisions that agents as a whole face.
3.1 Resolute choice
First, consider the series of decisions under uncertainty that an agent will face
throughout his lifetime. Suppose that the agent prefers that, over the course of
his lifetime, he choose some series of options over any other series; in our case,
suppose that he prefers that he always choose the option that maximizes expected
moral value. Now, suppose that the agent does not take this to imply that, on
each particular occasion, he ought to choose in accordance with his long-term
preference: on each decision, he ignores his long-term preference for his choosing
the higher-EV option consistently, and chooses a safer, lower-EV option. There
seems to be something irrational about such an agent, as if he cannot see how
his individual decisions aggregate. After all, if on each particular occasion, he
chooses contrary to his long-term preference, then his choices taken as a whole
amount to his doing exactly what he disprefers.
If we want to avoid such irrationality, then we cannot think of our decisions
in isolation. Rather, we should think of ourselves as in a dynamic choice problem,
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one in which an agent decides in light of the fact that his decision is embedded
in an entire series of decisions that he faces over time. The principle of dynamic
choice that I will endorse here is known as resolute choice, that an agent should
first choose the long-term plan that yields the most preferable lottery, and then,
on each occasion, choose as prescribed by the plan he has adopted, even though
doing so might go against his one-time preferences (McClennen 1990). For ex-
ample, suppose an agent prefers the lottery yielded by the plan to maximize EV
whenever he faces a decision under uncertainty to any other achievable lottery.
Resolute choice says that he ought to follow through with the plan, so that, on
each occasion, he does the thing that maximizes EV.
It should be clear how someone who adopts resolute choice evaluates deci-
sions indirectly. Instead of choosing the option that, considering the case as a
one-off, yields the best lottery, the agent evaluates each option by whether it ac-
cords with the long-term plan that yields the best lottery. Although a detailed
defense of resolute choice is beyond the scope of this paper,21 one consideration
in favor of it is that, at least in the kinds of cases we are considering, it avoids
forms of irrationality caused by following two rival principles of dynamic choice,
myopic choice and sophisticated choice. Myopic choice has an agent, in each
decision, choose whichever long-term plan she prefers at that point and make in-
dividual choices accordingly. The problem is that the plan that she prefers may
change: in the context of a series of decisions between a riskier, higher-EV op-
tion and a safer, lower-EV option, she starts off preferring the plan to choose
the former consistently; but when she gets toward the end of the series, the re-
maining series is no longer long enough for long-run preference to hold, and
she will prefer the plan to choose the latter consistently. She thus ends up being
diachronically inconsistent, failing to adopt the same plan throughout.
Sophisticated choice has an agent think about the choices she is likely to
make in each possible scenario, starting from those at the end of the series and
moving backward in time, and make choices so that, given those later choices, the
entire series of choices yields the best lottery. Sophisticated choice has an ad-
vantage over resolute choice in cases in which the agent is unlikely to follow
through with the plan that yields the best lottery. Suppose that an old acquain-
tance from graduate school is giving a talk in my department. It might be best if
I attend the talk (which I know will be bad) and ask a friendly question during
the Q&A; but given that I won’t be able to help myself and will make a scathing
remark instead if I attend the talk, which would be worse than if I don’t attend
21For defenses, see McClennen (1990, 1997), Gauthier (1997).
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the talk in the first place, I should not attend the talk at all.
Note that the scenarios that we are considering, however, are not like this.
I can easily stick to a plan to maximize expected moral value consistently, since
there is nothing psychologically unfeasible about sticking to it.22 And sophisti-
cated choice has well-known problems, especially in cases like these. After all,
consider a moderately risk-averse agent with the following preferences: (1) fol-
lowing long-run preference, he prefers that he choose the entire series of riskier
but higher-EV options to the series of safer but lower-EV options; (2) in a one-off
case, he prefers the safer option over the riskier one; and (3) in each decision, if he
anticipates that he will consistently choose the safer option in all later decisions,
he prefers the lottery yielded by those choices plus choosing the safer option in
the present decision to that yielded by those choices plus choosing the riskier
option. Now, suppose such an agent uses sophisticated choice. When the agent
only has one decision remaining (say, toward the end of his life), he will prefer
a lower-EV but safer option over a higher-EV but riskier one, and will end up
choosing the former. When he has two decisions remaining, knowing that he
will choose the safer option in the last decision, he chooses the safer option. Ap-
plying this reasoning recursively, at the outset, he knows that he will choose the
safer option in all later decisions, and he chooses the safer option. The effect of
his exercising sophisticated choice is that he will adopt a plan whose lottery he
disprefers to that yielded by another plan, one that is completely feasible. Such
an agent is guilty of a kind of irrationality, that of performing a suboptimal series
of acts when a clearly better, and completely feasible, series of acts is available to
him.23 This is not to say that there are not problems with resolute choice; but
at least in the context of the cases that we are considering, resolute choice is
preferable to sophisticated choice.24
22One might object that if resolute choice will force the agent to act against his preferences
toward the end of the series, then the agent at that point may no longer have reason to stick to
the plan; and if this is so, then it may be unfeasible for a rational agent to stick to the long-term
plan. I address this objection in §4.
23Thoma (2019) offers a similar argument against sophisticated choice in this kind of case.
24More generally, McClennen (1990) argues that none of the forms of dynamic choice can sat-
isfy all of three desiderata: (1) diachronic consistency, that the agent adopts the same plan through-
out, (2) normal form–extensive form convergence, that the agent would choose the same plan if all
of his choices were controlled by an initial single choice, and (3) separability, that in each deci-
sion, the agent is permitted to ignore historical background. Myopic choice violates 1, sophis-
ticated choice violates 2, and resolute choice violates 3. McClennen argues that the violation
of separability is the least bad option; in later work (McClennen 1997), he argues against taking
separability to be a requirement on dynamic choice at all.
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3.2 Rule consequentialism
Resolute choice requires the agent to think about his decisions more expan-
sively: the agent must pay attention to the entire series of decisions he faces when
making any particular choice. But it is possible to think about an even more ex-
pansive context of decision: we might think about the set of decisions faced by
agents as a whole. What are the principles of choice that we should endorse in
this context?
We can generalize, to some extent, the discussion of principles of dynamic
choice in the last section to address this question. Just as an agent can evaluate
decisions as one-offs, in isolation of any larger series of decisions he faces, he can
also evaluate them in isolation of any decisions faced by other agents. Assum-
ing that his moral preferences over different options are determined entirely by
morally relevant features of the lotteries yielded, he might endorse a principle
like the following:
One should choose the option that, considered in isolation, yields
the most preferable lottery.
We can label this principle naive act consequentialism, keeping in mind the
differences from what usually goes by that label of “act consequentialism”; for
one, we are restricting our attention here only to cases in which none of the op-
tions involves violating preexisting moral requirements. Nonetheless, just like
traditional act consequentialism in normative ethics, naive act consequential-
ism assesses a choice solely in terms of the (probabilistic) consequences of that
choice.
And, just as there are problems with viewing our decisions in isolation from
our other decisions, so too are there problems with viewing them in isolation
from the decisions of others. In the case of moderately risk-averse agents each
facing a choice between a riskier, higher-EV option and a safer, lower-EV option,
each might prefer the latter in a one-off decision; given long-run preference,
however, each prefers that they all choose the riskier option. If they follow naive
act consequentialism, then they will all choose the safer option, and the result
is that their choices together yield a lottery that everyone strongly disprefers.
While this might not constitute a form of collective irrationality, we still have
strong reason to avoid this outcome, so we should not endorse naive act conse-
quentialism.
One might think that we can avoid this problem by reformulating act conse-
quentialism so that agents pay attention to how other agents are likely to act:
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One should choose the option that, in combination with those that
other agents will choose, yields the most preferable lottery.
This principle is roughly analogous to sophisticated choice, so we might call it
sophisticated act consequentialism. And again, there are problems analogous
to those for sophisticated choice. Regardless of how he expects other agents
to choose, a moderately risk-averse agent might prefer the combination of those
choices and his choosing the safer option to the combination of those choices and
his choosing the riskier option. If each agent follows sophisticated act conse-
quentialism, then regardless of how he expects others to choose, he will choose
the safer option, and the collective result is again some collective choice that all
agents strongly disprefer.25
Finally, consider the following principle, analogous to resolute choice:
One should choose the option prescribed by the rule whose being
followed by everyone would yield the most preferable lottery.
Given that this principle assesses rules in terms of the lotteries they yield, and as-
sesses individual choices based on whether or not they accord with the best rule,
I will call it rule consequentialism. In fact, rule consequentialism is just a prob-
abilistic generalization of what usually goes under that label, the claim that one
should perform the act prescribed by the rule whose universal adoption would
have the best consequences (Brandt 1959, Hooker 2000); we simply replace talk
of the (deterministic) consequences of acts with talk of the (probabilistic) lotter-
ies yielded by choices, and talk of the best consequences with talk of the most
preferable lottery. Rule consequentialism avoids the problem of agents’ col-
lectively making a strongly dispreferred choice that naive and sophisticated act
consequentialism faced: if each agent follows rule consequentialism, then each
will choose in accordance with the rule to maximize EV (since, by long-run
preference, that rule yields the most preferable lottery), so that they collectively
choose the set of higher-EV options, just as each agent prefers. Just as with res-
olute choice, endorsement of rule consequentialism does not imply that there
25If we do not assume that risk-averse agents prefer the safer option regardless of how others
choose (which is inconsistent with long-run preference on EU theory), then each agent prefers
the riskier option if and only if enough other agents choose the riskier option. If each agent
believes that not enough other agents will choose the riskier option, then everyone will choose
the safer option, so we have the same problem as before. On the other hand, if each agent believes
that enough other agents will choose the riskier option, then everyone will choose the riskier
option, and sophisticated act consequentialism will coincide in its recommendations with rule
consequentialism.
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are no problems with the view; nonetheless, in the context of decision under
uncertainty, it avoids a serious problem that affects other principles of decision.
As I’ve shown, then, resolute choice and rule consequentialism are both in-
direct ways to assess decisions under uncertainty: we first identify the best plan
or policy for making choices, then choose accordingly in individual decisions.
Together with long-run preference, both imply that, when an agent faces a de-
cision under uncertainty, he morally should choose the option with the higher
expected moral value.
4 Objections
To close, I will discuss and respond to some objections to the overall argument.
First, one might not be convinced by the justifications that I offered for the
indirect modes of evaluation discussed in the last section, resolute choice and
rule consequentialism. In the case of the justification for rule consequential-
ism, perhaps it is convincing when addressed to an entire set of agents: it shows
that the set of agents have reason to follow rule consequentialism. But it doesn’t
follow from this that an individual agent has such reason. After all, a particular
agent may not be in a position to influence what other agents do; and regardless
of what they do, he prefers the combination of their choices and his making the
safer choice. So why should the group-based justification for rule consequential-
ism move him? And in the case of the justification for resolute choice, we can
imagine an agent who, previously having adopted resolute choice, is now near-
ing the end of her life. At this point, she knows that she will not face enough
decisions for long-run preference to apply, so she prefers that she choose the
safer, lower-EV option in all remaining decisions. It is true that choosing so
would violate the plan that she adopted at the outset; but the self who adopted
that plan is long gone, so why be bound by it?
To respond conclusively to this objection goes beyond the scope of this pa-
per, but let me sketch a response. Let’s first consider the response in the case of
rule consequentialism. It may be that my deviating from the best rule yields a
lottery that is preferable to that yielded by my following the rule. Nonetheless,
I know that everyone’s deviating from that rule would yield a much worse lot-
tery. I do not endorse this, so to justify my deviating from the rule, I need to
find some reason why I alone should be excused from it. But there is no such
reason: my position is identical to that of every other agent, who is aware of the
same considerations that I am aware of. I am thus seeking an exception for my-
self from some rule that we would all endorse, even though there are no grounds
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for that exception. In doing so, I am failing to see myself as an equal to other
agents, which is ipso facto morally objectionable. If someone has a conception of
morality as a set of rules that reasonable agents who regard each other as equals
would accept, he will not be moved by the consideration that his violating one
of these rules leads to a better result.26
What about the response in the case of resolute choice? Just as a willingness
to break the best set of rules expresses a morally deficient conception of one’s
relation to others, one might think that a willingness to go against one’s long-
term preferences expresses a deficient conception of the relation between differ-
ent temporal stages of the self. After all, it seems plausible that a requirement on
thinking of oneself as an agent who exists across time is to form long-term prefer-
ences and to subordinate one’s immediate preferences to them. If I’m unwilling
to endure the momentary discomfort of exercise for the sake of my long-term
goal to stay healthy, then in some sense I’m not thinking of the future self that
will benefit from my current discomfort as me. Given that, from the perspec-
tive of the agent’s entire life, the agent prefers the series of choices in which she
chooses the higher-EV option consistently, those preferences must have some
uptake in the agent’s deliberations in each decision in order for her to think of
herself as an agent who exists across time at all, rather than as a momentary self
alienated from the past selves who made the earlier decisions. To the extent that
the agent conceives of herself diachronically, she must take herself to be bound
to the plans that express her long-term preferences, and that speaks in favor of
resolute choice.27
Next, I want to discuss several related objections that concern the use of res-
olute choice in the overall argument. One might first object that they fail to
show that agents should always maximize expected moral value. Consider some-
one toward the end of his life, who has only a few decisions under uncertainty
remaining. Since the series of remaining decisions is too short for long-run pref-
erence to apply, it may very well be that the morally best plan for the agent to
26I am alluding here to a broadly contractualist justification of rule consequentialism, according
to which moral principles are those that all reasonable agents would accept as those for a system
of social interaction. Although the most familiar form of contractualism (Scanlon 1998) is quite
different from rule consequentialism, Derek Parfit (2011) has (controversially) argued that rule
consequentialism and the most plausible form of contractualism converge. And given persistent
doubts about whether Scanlon’s version of contractualism can restrict how much aggregation it
allows (Norcross 2002, Kumar 2011), it may be that it collapses to rule consequentialism too.
27McClennen (1997) makes a similar point in greater detail, although in the language of coordi-
nation between different temporal stages rather than subordination to some temporally-extended
self.
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adopt is one on which he chooses the safer option in each decision. Resolute
choice would then advise him, in each decision, to choose the safer option, even
if it has lower expected moral value.
Second, continuing from this example, contrast this agent with someone to-
ward the beginning of her life. Given that this younger agent likely has a large
number of decisions under uncertainty remaining, long-run preference will ap-
ply to that series of decisions, so that the best plan for her to adopt is one on
which she chooses the higher-EV option in each decision. Now, the two agents
might find themselves in identical scenarios, but, given that the best plan for one
is different from the best plan for the other, resolute choice says that what one
ought to do differs from what the other ought to do: the younger agent should
choose the riskier response in a case like disease, while the older agent should
choose the safer one. But the mere fact that an agent has adopted some long-
term plan does not seem like it should make a difference for what that agent
should do in such an important decision.
My response to the first objection is simply to concede the point: the ar-
gument through resolute choice does not show that such an agent would have
reason to maximize expected moral value. Indeed, the conditions on long-run
preference mean that there are other cases in which an agent is not obligated to
do so: for example, if there is one decision whose stakes swamp the combined
stakes of all of the other decisions. Nonetheless, the argument still shows that,
for almost all agents and in almost all decisions, the agent ought to choose the
option that maximizes expected moral value. Given the fact that most people are
risk-averse, such a conclusion still has highly revisionary consequences for how
people should make moral decisions under uncertainty.
In response to the second objection, I want to note that the fact that reso-
lute choice entails that what an agent should do in a particular decision depends
not just on intrinsic features of the decision, but also on what the agent has de-
cided in the past is a consequence of the well-known fact that resolute choice
violates a principle known as separability: that, whenever the agent faces a deci-
sion, she is permitted to think about it in isolation from what she has already
decided. Rejecting separability is not as counterintuitive as it seems. For one,
there are cases in which we think our past commitments carry some normative
weight: committing oneself to do something because one has promised to do so
certainly gives us moral reason to do that thing. For another, as I’ve already men-
tioned, taking oneself to be bound by commitments formed in the past might be
a prerequisite for thinking of oneself diachronically in important ways. So it is
unclear why we have to take a temporally narrow view of the decision when we
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deliberate morally.
Finally, while the argument might appear to have these counterintuitive con-
sequences, this is a result of its conditional nature. Again, the argument aims
to show that even if moderate risk aversion is permissible, agents should still typi-
cally maximize expected moral value. It is compatible with this conditional that
no attitude besides perfect risk neutrality is permissible, from which it directly
follows that one should always maximize expected moral value. To the extent
that assuming the permissibility of risk aversion leads to counterintuitive conse-
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